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1 Introduction
Demographic change, persistent and
disproportionate unemployment and their feared
implications for political disorder are key drivers
of growing donor attention to youth as a
development category. Bilateral and multilateral
donors thus increasingly seek to mainstream
youth-related goals on health, education,
employment and governance into development
policies that cater to youth needs and aspirations
(GSDRC 2011). While youth participation in
policy processes has potential to channel their
energy, passions and frustrations, it often turns
out to be deficient, tokenistic, or too episodic to
be meaningful (SPW/DFID-CSO 2010; GSDRC
2011; McGee and Greenhalf 2011). Donors thus
increasingly seek mechanisms to enhance youth
participation (GSDRC 2011), raising questions
such as what is meaningful participation? How
can voice be extended into influence? Who should
participate, through what forms, and how can
participation be appropriately institutionalised? 
This article argues that answering these
important questions will require donors to pay
greater attention to existing national youth
policies (NYPs).1 NYPs were established
throughout Africa from the early 1980s, and have
mushroomed since. They express African
governments’ ideas on youth development
challenges, on how to address these, and suggest
more or less explicit theories of change. This
article analyses the NYPs of Tanzania, Nigeria
and Zambia, whose selection was driven by
availability of secondary material. It is
recognised that in coming years, these policies
are likely to be influenced by the African Union’s
African Youth Charter (African Union 2006),
which became legally binding in 2010. The
analysis of NYPs also provides a perspective on
how African nations are likely to use policies to
address a widely perceived ‘youth in agriculture
problem’. In a nutshell, this asserts that youth
labour, energy and enterprise is essential to
successful agricultural growth and
transformation, yet young people lack motivation
for a career in farming (Anyidoho et al. 2012). 
The article analyses the NYPs with reference to
contemporary debates on youth in policy
processes, and focuses on two aspects of the
policy environment. First, it analyses
philosophies of intervention of the NYPs,
through an assessment of target groups; roles
90
Young People in African (Agricultural)
Policy Processes? What National
Youth Policies Can Tell Us
Dolf J.H. te Lintelo
Abstract The ‘youth in agriculture problem’ makes up part of a growing set of ‘youth in development’ issues
occupying the minds of aid practitioners and bilateral and multilateral donors. Aid agendas seek to enhance
youth participation in policy processes and mainstream youth-related goals on health, education,
employment and governance into development policies. Yet, these agendas routinely ignore national youth
policies (NYPs), which in many African countries have been in place for well over a decade. This article
demonstrates how NYPs in Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia express distinct policy visions, identifications and
imaginations of the youth ‘problematique’, and particular philosophies of intervention. It argues that while
their substantive content may well be subject to dialogue and reform, NYPs also express conceptualisations
of the policy process and roles for knowledge, evidence and collective action that sit uneasily with new
donor agendas, and are less amenable to change. 
IDS Bulletin Volume 43  Number 6  November 2012   © 2012 The Author. IDS Bulletin © 2012 Institute of Development Studies
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
assigned to urban and rural youth; the social
construction of the ‘youth development problem’
and youth images. Second, it considers how
policy documents assert particular models of the
policy process, to suggest a propensity for
particular forms of youth participation.
Accordingly, I assess how NYPs incorporate
normative and empirical perspectives on the
policy process, in particular regarding the role of
evidence, knowledge, expertise and collective
action by state and non-state actors. 
In the first section, the article discusses youth
policies in international arenas to note the great
variation in the ways in which youth is
conceptualised and operationalised in policy and
legislation. The next section explores policy
discourses to assess assumptions that underpin
youth policies in Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia. I
first summarise key debates in the international
development community, and then analyse the
philosophies of intervention of case country
youth policies. Next, the article places the NYPs
within the context of academic debates on youth
participation. The last section reconnects the
discussion to the theme of youth in agriculture. 
1.1 The growing momentum of youth policies in
(inter)national arenas
Although youth has been part of the
international community’s policy agenda at least
since 1965, it gained particular momentum from
the mid-1980s onwards, with the UN declaring
1985 as the first International Year of Youth. The
subsequent Millennium Development Goals
(No 8) aim to integrate alienated youth in the
global economy, and sets out ‘Developing and
implementing strategies for decent and
productive work for youth’ (target 16) (Chaaban
2009: 35). 2010 was declared another UN
International Year of Youth, with the slogan ‘Our
youth, our voice’. Similarly, the African Union
designated 2008 as the African Youth Year, and
has declared 2009–19 as the decade of youth
development (African Union 2011).
UN bodies like the ILO, UNDP, UNICEF and
UNESCO have long encouraged national
policymakers to cater to youth, promoting
national youth policies as ‘indispensable’, a
‘symbol of society’s commitment to its young
citizens’ and as ‘one of the highest priorities of
society’ (UNESCO 2004: 5, 6, 35). The African
Union and regional bodies such as the East
African Community also increasingly aim to steer
domestic youth policy agendas. For instance,
Article 12 of the African Youth Charter (AYC)
sets out that ‘State Parties shall develop a
comprehensive and coherent national youth
policy’ for subsequent enactment into law (African
Union 2006). As the Charter was activated in
August 2010, and with ratification processes
ongoing in countries, the AYC can be expected to
increasingly drive youth policy reforms.
2 How policies identify youth 
Some consider that the creation of ‘youth’ as a
category in Africa is a post-colonial phenomenon
promoted by ministries of ‘Youth Sports and
Culture’ and youth wings of political parties,
while being nowadays further underwritten by a
global consumption-oriented youth culture
(Frederiksen 2010: 1078). Donor agencies
consider youth a specific social category ‘laden
with risk and uncertainty’ (UNESCO 2004: 6).
Yet, for all its intuitive appeal, a clear distinction
between youth, children and adults is less
straightforward than it appears. A bewildering
range of definitions and working definitions are
used for youth, often organised around age but
sometimes around alternative criteria, hindering
comparative research. 
Where youth is defined in age-based terms
actual age ranges vary. The African Youth
Charter considers youth as people between
15–35 years of age. The official UN definition of
youth refers to people in the age bracket 15–24,
which is followed by Tanzania and Zambia in
their youth policies. Nigeria defines youths as
persons of ages 18–35. Further, even within
countries, administrative parts of the state do
not necessarily define youth in the same way
(Wallace and Bendit 2009). Thus, while legal
systems depend on clear-cut definitions, legal
minimum ages may vary by gender, and by
purpose, for instance for marriage, voting rights,
criminal responsibility, military service, access to
alcoholic beverages, and consent to medical
treatment or sexual intercourse. In Tanzania,
the NYP considers people between 15–18 years of
age as youth but its Children Development
Policy considers this group as children
(Government of Tanzania 1996a). 
One drawback of age-based definitions is that
they can be insensitive to culturally specific
notions of youth, childhood and adulthood. Thus,
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‘we cannot define children or childhood on the
basis of age because a “child” is not the same
everywhere. Childhood may be universal as a
phenomenon but the position of a child is formed
in relation to culturally and geographically
specific institutions, traditions and forms of
family life’ (Kallio and Hakli 2010: 357).
Moreover, even though youth’s transitional
nature is universally accepted (UNESCO 2004),
transition processes and foci vary and are subject
to change. While some donor agencies focus on
particular transitions – for example, the
transition from school into work (e.g. Garcia and
Fares 2008; UNECA 2009) – this makes up only
one part of a multilayered and often gendered
transition to adulthood. 
Sociological understandings highlight that a
young person’s transition to adulthood takes
place on multiple axes (MacDonald et al. 2001),
through ‘boundary events’ concerning:
school/occupation, family/matrimony and
citizenship (Lloyd 2006). However, such
transitions are increasingly understood as being
non-linear (UN 2005; Lloyd 2006), as the social,
matrimonial, family, residential and citizenship
factors that condition an individual’s passage to
adult life are more and more fluid. For instance,
Lloyd notes that compared to the early 1990s,
young people in developing countries are
nowadays: entering adolescence earlier and
healthier; more likely to spend their adolescence
in school; more likely to delay marriage and
childbearing; and more likely to have a
postponed entry to the labour force.2 There is
greater variety between individuals (or cohorts)
than ever before, with highly individualised and
fuzzy trajectories, that are often partial, iterative
or delayed (Calves et al. 2009; Locke and te
Lintelo (forthcoming)). For instance, a 36-year-
old unemployed and unmarried Tanzanian man
living with his parents may be seen as a ‘youth’,
despite having passed the age range identified in
the national youth policy. 
Some national youth policy documents reference
both an age-based and more culturally sensitive
identification of youths. Tanzania employs an
age-based working definition, but also explicitly
recognises that youth concerns a transition period
from childhood to adulthood. It acknowledges a
variety of community-specific understandings of
what youth entails, and notes that commonly, in
this period, young people are expected to start
participating in various development activities.
Youth are expected to begin to show maturity in
thought and reasoning, decisiveness in action,
and gain a certain measure of self-reliance
(Government of Tanzania 1996b). Its cultural
sensitivity makes the policy potentially amenable
to the growing fluidity in youth transitions. 
While some youth policies identify target groups,
recognising that youth are not homogenous,
targeting often involves the identification of very
broad categories. Nigerian policy thus lists as
targets: students in post-primary schools; students
in tertiary institutions; out-of-school, unemployed
youth; female adolescents; youths with
disabilities; youths with health problems and
youths engaged in substance abuse, cultism and
delinquency (Government of Nigeria 2001). The
Government of Zambia (1994) identifies two
priority groups: rural youths and the disabled
(chapter 1.8). The Tanzanian youth policy
(Government of Tanzania 1996b) does not identify
specific priority targets, but directs the ministries
to develop particular programmes. For instance,
the Ministry of Agriculture is directed to prepare
farming and livestock programmes (chapter 5.8.1)
and to develop strategies to train youth in modern
agriculture (5.8.2). More generally, it is important
to note that youth policies have wellbeing rather
than anti-poverty objectives, that is, they tend not
to prioritise the poor.
3 Youth policies: philosophies of intervention 
In this section, I explore policy discourses on the
nature of the problems to be addressed by youth
development interventions. I first summarise key
debates in the international development
community, and then discuss issues identified in
national youth policies. 
3.1 Problems, images, and policy aims
(Inter)national youth policies typically discuss
themes such as (sexual) health; employment;
education; armed conflict; globalisation; poverty;
culture, etc. (e.g. UN 2005; UNECA 2009).
Increasingly, they highlight a role for youth in
policy processes. However, the dominant issues
identified concern the interlinkages of demography,
unemployment and political insecurity. 
The rapid and sustained increase in the number
of young people in the global South is one of
today’s most significant demographic trends.
Around 90 per cent of young people reside in
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developing countries (Shankar 2010). By 2030
Africa is projected to have as many youth as East
Asia and by 2050 could also exceed the youth
population in South Asia (Garcia and Fares
2008). Young people make up approximately
30 per cent of the total population in African
countries, and this is increasing fast (Panday
2006), with concomitant growth in (even higher)
shares of the working population. The growing
number of young people entails a process of
demographic change; societal ‘rejuvenation’ in a
literal sense. For instance, in 2005, 76 per cent of
the Zambian population were under 30 years of
age, with those aged 20–29 years accounting for
a mere 18 per cent (CSO 2007). 
Whereas some commentators are pessimistic
about the prospects for economic growth and
poverty reduction in Africa (e.g. Collier 2008),
youth bulges are recognised by many as a window
of opportunity. They offer a demographic dividend:
where a larger workforce with fewer dependents
could generate strong economic growth (Garcia
and Fares 2008; Gunatilake et al. 2010). Yet,
experiences to date are mixed: while a conducive
policy environment in East Asia harnessed the
dividend to achieve strong growth, similar
demographic dynamics in Latin America failed
to yield better economic outcomes (Garcia and
Fares 2008).
Youth bulges are, however, also associated with
severe levels of unemployment, and youth are
seen as among the ‘most vulnerable and most
powerless [groups] in labour markets’ (YEN
n.d.). Recent global economic crises have hit
youth hardest (Shankar 2010) and their impacts
are not even included in youth unemployment
figures which already show that Africa, at 21 per
cent, is more severely affected than the world at
large (14 per cent) (UNECA 2005: 167–202).
Ironically, while both the health and educational
status of African youth are better than ever
(Garcia and Fares 2008)3 the ‘educated
unemployed’ has been identified as a new social
category (Jeffrey 2008, 2010). Compared to
adults, African young people have much higher
unemployment rates and operate more in the
informal economy on lower wages and in more
precarious jobs (Keune and Monticone 2004). 
Growing youth bulges and widespread
unemployment are often associated with
insecurity, urban social unrest and political
instability (Urdal and Hoelscher 2009;
Frederiksen 2010).4 Thus, a 2003 UN Security
Council mission to West Africa reported that: ‘In
every county visited, the mission heard about the
problem of unemployment, particularly among
young people, and how this was a perennial
source of instability in West Africa.’ The ‘Arab
Spring’ reaffirms perspectives on the threat of
large numbers of unemployed and impoverished
youth to prevailing political orders. 
National youth policy discourses in Nigeria,
Tanzania and Zambia dating from the 1990s,
show the enduring appeal of such images. They
situate analyses of youth needs, problems and
responsibilities within contexts of societal
change, political order, social breakdown and
economic decline. Unemployment is a key
concern, and the NYPs recognise that some
groups are particularly at risk. For instance, in
Tanzania and Zambia, 60–65 per cent of
unemployed people are youth, with girls
disproportionally affected. The Nigerian policy
notes that one in three disabled people is a
youth, and disability profoundly affects economic
opportunities. The policies observe that although
the majority of youth are based in rural areas,
many migrate in search of urban livelihood
opportunities, despite having limited education,
capital, equipment and technical skills.5
Young people are portrayed as either passive
clients of government services, as constrained
decision-makers, or autonomous agents able to
shape their own destinies (White and Wyn 1998,
in Curtain 2001). The NYPs emphasise not only
the first two, but also assert strong normative
aspirations for young people. The Tanzanian policy
(1996b) wants youth to assume responsibilities
as citizens, parents and leaders (chapter 3.1), to
support local communities, and to preserve
Tanzanian culture (2.0). The Nigerian policy (2001,
preface) considers youth as the ‘only real hope
for a great future… [their] energy, inventiveness,
character and orientation define the pace of
development and the security of a nation’. 
In some cases, the policies acknowledge that
young people are already living up to some of
these expectations, such as taking on political
leadership roles in Tanzania. Yet, in many cases,
the policies portray youth as deficient, complicit
victims failing to exercise a sufficient level of
responsibility and they are therefore in need of
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protection by a paternalist state. Here, the nation-
building narrative seems a particularly double-
edged sword, as it carries a strong normative load:
unemployment is not just undesirable from a
poverty or wellbeing perspective, but speaks of
individuals’ moral deficiency towards community
and nation. In a context of extreme scarcity of
jobs in the formal economy and tremendous
competition for these in the informal economy,
young people are thus doubly victimised.
Moreover, policies that strongly emphasise young
people as deficient risk institutionalising such
negative views (Checkoway 2011).
The NYPs note that it is not only young people
who are failing to discharge their obligations.
Parents, guardians and society at large are failing
to protect a group characterised as at a ‘tender
age’, having limited life skills and economic
needs. The Tanzanian policy (1996b) thus
emphasises that fast-changing economic, cultural
and social environments drive rapid changes in
youth aspirations, orientations, culture, values
and lifestyles. Foreign culture (and ‘modem
technology’) is seen as implicated in the decline
of established community systems of youth
upbringing and responsible parenthood. Zambian
policy (Government of Zambia 1994) notes a lack
of guidance, counselling, recreational facilities
and disintegrating families. The Nigerian youth
policy (2001) is particularly ambivalent. It offers
a eulogy to youth as ‘energetic, active and in the
most productive phase of their life as citizens’ but
also considers them ‘the most vulnerable segment
of the population socioeconomically, emotionally,
and in other respects’ (chapter 1.2). The
schizophrenic imagery sets up a policy that
emphasises the need for handholding and a
paternalistic promise of social engineering. Young
people need to be protected from themselves.
The policy thus seeks to ‘inculcate… the virtues
of patriotism, discipline, selfless service, honesty
and integrity’; ‘inculcate leadership and make
youth socially responsible and accountable’; and
conduct socialisation programmes, ‘so that they
can become good and productive citizens’ (2.5).
Similarly, in order to offset negative economic,
social, political and cultural influences (3.3),
Tanzanian policy (1996b) asserts the need for
education and media messages that teach
‘acceptable morals in accordance with the culture
of Tanzanians’ (5.6.6; 5.12.2). Such cultural
conservatism involves a move by adults to reclaim
youth who deliberately seek the modern as a
relatively ungoverned space for exploration and
expression (De Boeck and Honwana 2005). 
Moreover, invoking traditional tenets at a time
when youth transitions are increasingly
untenable, and more and more fluid in practice,
raises an important question: does youth policy
risk reinforcing social stigma associated with
incomplete transitions to adulthood? 
Interestingly, youth policies also reference state
failure. In Zambia’s case, the NYP is presented as
a response to the state’s failure to produce jobs
and foster economies in the wake of neoliberal
structural adjustment. As in Tanzania, state
retrenchment is seen as an important cause of
youth unemployment, while youth services were
cut simultaneously (Government of Zambia
1994). The Nigerian youth policy (2001) explicitly
critiques two decades of military rule, noting that
youth policy ‘suffered tremendous neglect’ and
ineffective implementation (1.4). Remarkably, it
argues that a weak policy environment has caused
growing un(der)employment, youth crime, illness
and reduced school enrolment (1.4). 
Accordingly, the Nigerian state is situated at the
very heart of youth development, as both cause
and solution. This informs a strategic policy
perspective that aims to empower youth to take
charge of their own destiny (chapter 1.1), but in a
disempowering top-down and highly directive
manner. Young people are the passive recipient, it
is ‘being trained’ (4.4.1), receiving moral and
ethical instruction by religious and community
leaders (6.3.1), and mobilised, rather than
enabled or encouraged to mobilise themselves.
Policy seeks to tap and channel youth energy, and
to make youth active participants in the shaping of
the destiny of the nation (chapter 1). The policy
‘aims to correctly guide, adequately mobilize and
fully integrate youth into the fabric of society to
support the goal of national development’. Youth
policies are thus as much about disciplining
undesirable behaviour and attitudes as about
developing skills, and advancing youth wellbeing. 
3.2 Conceptualising the policy process 
I now consider how national youth policies may
tell us something about how policymakers
envisage the policy process to function. I look at
three dimensions: the role of knowledge and
evidence; the role of collective action and
advocacy; and the role of participation. I argue
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that the particular ways in which policymakers
think about the nature of the policy process has
important implications for the ways in which
youth policies structure opportunities for and
constrain meaningful youth participation. 
The policy process literature identifies three
distinct analytical approaches. The stages model
essentially considers that the policy process is
made up of a sequence or cycle of successive
stages. Usually these are set out as: agenda
setting; policy formation (policy formulation and
decision-making); implementation, evaluation and
termination. This model assumes a hierarchy, with
a primacy of politics over, and its separation from
administration (Hill and Hupe 2009). It posits the
policy process as a rational and technocratic
problem-solving exercise, where values are
exogenous: thus, politicians decide, and the
bureaucracy executes policy. Here, scientific
knowledge is seen to allow politicians to make
better decisions, that is, ‘truth speaks to power’.
Experts play a critical role as generators and
conduits of appropriate knowledge. Higher quality
and more robust knowledge generates better
policy decisions, and the role of non-bureaucratic
actors in shaping policy content is de-emphasised.
It considers a quite strict separation of state and
society – where the latter provides input through
the election of politicians but is otherwise standing
at a distance from the policy process. While this
model has been much criticised for its empirical
lack of fit, linearity and lack of explanatory
potential (Howlett and Ramesh 1998; John 1998;
Sabatier 2007), as a heuristic device it is widely
used and is reflected in commonly held beliefs
about the policy process (de Leon 1999; Hill 2009). 
Yet, the stages model downplays the contested
nature of policy processes. Alternative
conceptualisations of the policy process
emphasise the relationship between knowledge,
power and policy; processes of bargaining; the
social construction of policy problems and
solutions through particular narratives, framings
and discourses that are furthered by particular
social and state actors, actor-networks and
coalitions, and the roles of ideas, interests, values
and beliefs in these. The Advocacy Coalitions
Framework and a set of ‘argumentative turn’ or
deliberative analyses have distinct epistemological
positions, but both emphasise the interactions
between state and societal actors throughout the
policy process. They emphasise the role of
collective action, and the ways in which civil
society groups continuously aim to engage with
and influence policy. Policy processes are thus
not seen as involving the best technocratic
decisions, but rather as involving contestation and
power struggles. Whereas an advocacy coalition
approach argues that these contestations need to
be empirically established, a deliberative
approach emphasises the normative requirement
for the state to foster ongoing participation and
actively involve non-state actors (Sabatier 1998,
1999; Burton 2006).
4 Knowledge, evidence and collective action
Good youth policy should be based on facts and
research on young people rather than
assumptions and speculation (European Youth
Forum 2001), yet the collection of comparative
high-quality data is hindered by the variation in
definitions employed. 
An assessment of the NYPs of the case countries
does not provide sufficient material to allow
strong conclusions on the role of evidence and
knowledge. Some passages hint at a technocratic
policy process perspective. Both Tanzanian and
Nigerian policies offer a situational analysis of
the nature of the youth development challenge.
The Zambian policy (Government of Zambia
1994) does not, but recognises that its efforts
have been ‘seriously affected by lack of data to
gauge with precision and certainty the nature,
extent and magnitude of youth problems. There
is insufficient disaggregated data useful for
planning’ (chapter 1.3). Similarly, the Tanzanian
policy (1996b) acknowledges the importance of
data for informing policy and planning, and
plans for research and data collection on youth
and youth activities (chapter 4.2.1). In Nigeria,
universities and research institutes are to
monitor and evaluate implementation of the
National Youth Development Policy (chapter
6.7.2) to ‘provide useful guidance’ for policy
review and ‘enhance the process and machinery
of implementation’ (7.4). Such evidence supports
a technocratic policy process, where: ‘policy
success depends on [good] programme/project
formulation, implementation and co-ordination,
all of which in turn depend on the institutional
capacity of the implementation organisation’
(Government of Zambia 1994, chapter 1.8). 
NYPs also have fairly explicit visions on the role of
non-state actors from the private sector and civil
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society in the policy process. Such actors are
recognised and promoted, yet predominantly
allocated roles as service deliverers rather than as
active, independent contributors to policy
deliberation, formulation and review. Thus, the
Tanzanian policy (1996b) seeks to enable youth
and community mobilisation for youth rights
(chapter 3.2) yet is silent about youth associations
engaging with the formulation or implementation
of policy and programmes. It also notes that
representatives of Youth Economic Groups will be
involved in Youth Development Committees, but
how these groups are composed, what they do and
how they are involved is not clarified. 
The Nigerian policy promotes fora for regular
consultation between student unions and the
school management (6.2.2), and encourages the
formation of youth organisations to provide
services and promote group-based activities for
young people (chapters 6.2.2, 6.3.1, 2). Successful
policy implementation ‘depends very much on
mutual cooperation, partnership and solidarity of
action among the various stakeholders’ and on
their effective coordination (7.1). While this
suggests a less stagist approach to collective
action, the NYP nevertheless offers a dirigiste, top-
down vision: ‘the Federal government will provide
direction and leadership, other stakeholders such
as local and state governments, non-governmental
organisations, and private-sector entities must
play their assigned partnership roles’ (6.1, emphasis
added). Such assigned partnership roles not only
suggest a limited critical contribution from non-
state partners, but also sit uneasily with discourses
of participation that are prominent in international
debates about youth in development. 
Youth participation in policy processes is
receiving more and more recognition, as a
political right (SPW/DFID-CSO 2010) and for
programming reasons (UNESCO 2004; YEN
n.d.). It is seen as central to efforts at
mainstreaming youth-related goals into donors’
core development policy, both in sectoral
interventions (education, employment, health,
etc.) and governance challenges (SPW/DFID-
CSO 2010; African Union 2011; GSDRC 2011).
The African Youth Charter obliges state parties
to take measures to guarantee youth
participation in parliament and other decision-
making bodies, ensure gender equality of access
(Article 11) and to grant a right to actively
participate in the design, implementation and
evaluation of development strategies and policies
(African Union 2006; Panday 2006). 
Internationally, youth policies aim to develop
strategies that ‘help young people to make the
right choices, protect them from exploitation
and neglect and ensure their participation in all
spheres of society’ (UNESCO 2004: 6). Similarly,
the policy aims of the case studies stress
empowerment (Nigeria), realisation of rights,
enhanced youth welfare and quality of life,
opportunities for self-actualisation and human
development (Tanzania, Nigeria and Zambia)
and effective participation in (national)
socioeconomic development (Tanzania, Nigeria). 
Arguments in favour of youth participation
intertwine normative and empirical elements.
There is a clear need to gain a stronger empirical
understanding of youth participation in policy
processes, not least because mass media, social
science, and professional practice tend to
emphasise their deficiencies and disengagement
(Checkoway 2011). Few independent evaluations
have assessed youth participation and its impacts
(UN 2003: 285) and information on basic
indicators for international comparisons is not
available. 
Proponents of youth participation emphasise its
potential to promote personal development,
substantive knowledge and practical skills,
facilitation of the exercise of civic rights, and
contributions to a more democratic society (UN
2003, 2005; Checkoway 2011; YEN n.d.).
Participation may improve policy processes by
bringing a ‘user perspective’ (young people’s
knowledge, experience and commitment) to
policy issues (UN 2003; Williamson 2007;
SPW/DFID-CSO 2010; YEN n.d.). It enhances
policy ownership, legitimacy and durability and
promotes youth integration (UNESCO 2004) and
thus benefits both young people and society at
large by contributing to economic and social
development (UN 2003). 
As social actors with skills, drive and capacities,
young people should be seen as part of the
solution to the difficulties they face. They can
draw on a unique body of experience and a
tremendous amount of energy, passion and
creativity (UN 2003; Yeo 2008; YEN n.d.). Failure
to do so risks weak policy because of a disconnect
between the life-worlds and life experiences of
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adult decision-makers and youth (UN 2003),
particularly as migration, mobility and a greater
variety of youth lifestyles generate growing
complexity. Some have accordingly called for a
more representative bureaucracy (Yeo 2008).
Finally, the argument is advanced that a failure
to enhance youth participation in policy
processes risks policy failure, crime, violence and
intergenerational discord (YEN n.d.).
Agreement on the need for participation is one
thing, consensus on its purpose and forms,
another. Is participation about ‘community
service,’ or ‘social action,’ or ‘civic engagement’
(Checkoway 2011: 340)? The UN General
Assembly defines (and encourages) youth
participation as involving: economic
participation, relating to work and development;
social participation, relating to community
involvement; cultural participation, relating to
the arts, cultural values and expression; and
political participation, relating to decision-
making processes. These four elements are
reaffirmed in the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child (1989), which promotes
the principle that children and young people6 are
entitled to express (and have taken seriously)
their views on all matters that affect them.
Article 12 sets out participation as a procedural
right to take part in and influence processes,
decisions and activities (UN 2003). 
Often, youth participation is presented as a
‘citizen-making device’, teaching (moral)
responsibility, civic values, human rights, and an
encouragement to ‘become active members of a
democratic society’ (McGee and Greenhalf 2011;
YEN n.d.: 11). The NYPs studied also use such
rhetoric, and the African Youth Charter
expresses a republican notion of citizenship. It
sets out a ‘social contract between the State and
the Youths’ that ‘addresses the rights and
obligations of young people’ towards their
families, society and the state. Yet, the emphasis
on citizenship development has a discriminatory
tinge – after all, such demands are rarely made
on adults. Emphasising citizenship deficiencies
hence may perversely legitimate young people’s
unequal treatment. 
While there are no shortages of positive examples,7
too often youth policy and legislation remains
piecemeal (UNESCO 2004) and involvement in
policy processes marginal (YEN n.d.). Few
countries have made youth participation an
integral aspect of national politics and policy
processes (UNESCO 2004). Where they have,
more accountability and transparency is needed
on how suggestions in youth participation forums
are acted upon (Yeo 2008).
Nevertheless, a growing number and variety of
institutional forms provide ‘spaces of
participation’, enabling exchange between
generations, languages, cultural groups and
religions (UNESCO 2004). National Youth
Councils (umbrella organisations for youth
organisations) have been set up in over a 100 UN
member states, sometimes as a statutory body
(e.g. in Uganda and Malawi). Youth boards,
associations, networks, NGOs and other forms
operate across sub-Saharan Africa. Nigeria
created a Youth Parliament in 2008, which is to
be replicated across the 36 states and 774 local
governments (Commonwealth Secretariat 2010).
The government of Tanzania is in the process of
developing a national youth participation
strategy and also reserves ten seats in
parliament for the youth wing of the leading
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party (Dahl
Jensen 2010). 
Successful institutionalisation of processes which
bring youth and decision-makers together has
significant advantages over informal and ad hoc
consultations, as they help to build mutual trust
and inspire constructive engagement (YEN n.d.).
Besides platforms for exchange, institutionalisation
may also take the form of the allocation of a
proportion of relevant budgets to youth
development; the systematic application of a youth
assets rather than youth problems perspective
across policies; regular monitoring, data collection
and reporting of youth development efforts,
outputs and outcomes (SPW/DFID-CSO 2010).
Yet, questions about appropriate and meaningful
youth participation remain and key lessons from
critiques on the participation turn in
development (such as the need to consider power
dynamics) are often ignored. In some countries,
National Youth Councils are key stakeholders in
decision-making on youth issues, in others they
have purely symbolic status (UNICEF 2010), or
are dysfunctional. Dependence on state funding
makes youth councils vulnerable to political
interference (Maguire 2007: 34; YEN n.d.). In
Tanzania, the National Youth Council was never
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functional due to a civil society boycott in protest
to its membership being dominated by youth
wing members of the leading political party (Dahl
Jensen 2010). More so, the decentralised Youth
Development Committees at regional, district,
ward and village levels that were to coordinate
NYP implementation efforts were dominated by
non-youth. One unanswered question then is
under which conditions innovative forms of
governance can become institutionalised. 
Moreover, questions remain about the nature of
participation, and who participates. By artificially
clustering a wide variety of young people with
diverse needs, desires and problems, the ‘youth’
terminology involves a serious oversimplification,
and policy risks becoming insensitive to
difference such as gender, class, geographic
location, etc. For instance, poor young Africans
face diverse sources of marginalisation. Poverty
and youth often intersect with identity aspects
(ascribed or otherwise) that confer disadvantage,
such as gender; rural residence; ethnicity/caste;
disability or being a migrant (SPW/DFID-CSO
2010: 8–9). Diverse youth representation in
participatory forums hence is by no means
assured. Resource constraints and logistical
considerations often mean youth consultations
have a strong urban bias, while proceedings may
only be conducted in the official administrative
languages. Consequently, the views of rural and
uneducated poor youth (and other subgroups)
may not be heard. 
Youth leadership is often fragmented,
uncoordinated, and in mainstream civil society
tends to be composed of well-educated men, with
limited experience and understanding of
marginalised urban youth needs. Such leaders
are unlikely to represent the views and needs of
the non-elite, under-educated youth majority
(Sommers 2010). Youth movements thus risk
replicating the approach of many adult
organisations in working for rather than
empowering disadvantaged young people
(UN 2003). 
Perhaps no population group is more at risk, as
well as overlooked, than adolescent girls and
young women. The relatively few youth
programmes and organisations that exist are
dominated by male youth, while existing
women’s programmes and organisations are
often dominated by more senior women
(Sommers 2006). Marginalised female youth are
under-represented in all forms of civil society,
while marginalised male youth may be involved
in forms of civil society distinct from mainstream
forms (Sommers 2010). This is partially because
of a strong ‘youth and political disorder’
discourse; even in donor programming ‘vigilance
is needed to ensure that ‘youth’ does not start to
mean only boys and young men’ (Maguire 2007). 
4.1 ‘Participation-light’: sociocultural and institutional
factors
National youth policies in the case countries
adopt a ‘participation-light’ approach. They
suffer from weaknesses common to participatory
development discourses (Cooke and Kothari
2001). NYPs pay little attention to political
participation, integration into adult society, and
fostering youth autonomy and fail to develop
meaningful forms of participation that can help
to bring about youth engagement in policy
processes on their own terms. Tanzania thus
argues for participation, but not as a cross-cutting
imperative (only in a few ministries), and not in
village government, and suggests its purpose is to
prepare youth for leadership roles. The Zambian
NYP argues for national, not local youth advocacy.
The Nigerian NYP aims to involve youths in
decision-making at all levels of government in all
matters affecting them (chapter 2.5). It was
produced through nationwide consultations with
youth organisations, administrators and NGOs
through Zonal Youth Summits and is monitored
by five-yearly reviews involving young people.
Nevertheless, the policy exudes a strong top-down
ethos and a very passive role for youth, which sits
uneasily with a more substantial form of
participation. 
Having voice hence does not necessarily
translate as having influence. Indeed, often
‘youth advocacy’ is constructed as a process in
which adults represent the interests of youth
without any mechanisms of accountability to
young people themselves (Checkoway et al. 2005:
1158). Young people often view engagement in
governance processes as flawed: they feel treated
as a ‘token’ young person, condescended to and
being present but not heard (McGee and
Greenhalf 2011: 22). This incentivises
withdrawal, but also risks reinforcing negative
perceptions of piecemeal youth engagement
(SPW/DFID-CSO 2010). Moreover, the issues
expressed by young people may be the ones given
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to them by adults, such as parents and teachers.
In contrast, when young people identify their
own issues it can inspire and move them into
action. After all, ‘young people are experts on
being young people, regardless of what others
think’ (Checkoway 2011: 342). 
Also, government officials with direct experience
of working with young people are often more
open to involving them in decision-making
processes (McGee and Greenhalf 2011).
Nevertheless, entrenched sociocultural norms
can systematically devalue young people’s
participation in decision-making. Notions that
emphasise a close relationship between seniority
and authority militate against more egalitarian
notions that underpin the argument for youth
participation in policy processes. In particular,
respecting the right of 15–18-year-olds
represents an enormous challenge to traditional
attitudes in most highly patriarchal or highly
stratified societies (UN 2003; YEN n.d.). Adults
may see themselves as somehow better than
youth because of their age and therefore feel
entitled to act upon them. Assumptions about
youth as immature, unproductive and ignorant
constrain young people’s access to decision-
making spaces (McGee and Greenhalf 2011).
Adult authorities’ fear of youth can also
undermine public participation (Checkoway
2011). In Tanzania, a culture of not speaking up
is an important obstacle to young women’s
participation in decision-making, from the family
to the public sphere (Dahl Jensen 2010).
Engrained attitudes to policy processes as
expert-driven also tend to devalue young
people’s inputs (YEN n.d.). 
It is not unusual that participation in public
affairs attracts particular youth groups. Many
studies note that young people are uninvolved or
minimally involved, while small groups that are
typically not representative of the general
population are extremely active. Income,
education, and socioeconomic status all tend to
correlate positively with individual participation
(Checkoway 2011). Limited education and
training inadequately equips young people to
confidently participate in decision-making, and
this is exacerbated by social exclusion and
inequality (Maguire 2007; SPW/DFID-CSO 2010).
While lower income people may participate less
than higher income people in formal politics, this
should not be interpreted as disengagement from
democracy. Rather, it should be noted that the
poor tend to participate in ways that are more
appropriate to their situation (Checkoway 2011).
As such, it would be interesting to assess whether
and how poor youngsters are involved in social
accountability mechanisms, which are an
increasingly popular response to disillusionment
with formal accountability mechanisms (McGee
and Greenhalf 2011). 
Besides sociocultural factors, institutional
features of the polity influence which youth
participate. Civil society in African countries
enjoys substantial variation in political freedoms,
and this frames the possible and realised
organisational shapes that youth participation
may take. In Tanzania for instance, the 2002
NGO Act makes critical youth groups vulnerable
to censorship, and they thus have to very
carefully navigate government sensitivities when
expressing political or policy critiques (Dahl
Jensen 2010). Some young people lack access to
the processes through which adults can
articulate their concerns. Very few countries give
15–18-year-olds voting rights. Moreover, youth
lack access to the courts and the media, while
trade unions and professional associations often
focus on the formal economy, in which few young
people are employed (UN 2003; Maguire 2007). 
Supportive, coordinated legal and policy
frameworks are thus key to enhancing
meaningful youth participation and to foster
youth as partners and leaders in development
(SPW/DFID-CSO 2010). They should support
young people’s skills, capabilities and capacity to
act on their own lives, and aim to remove
barriers to their agency, which are generated and
maintained by social power inequities. Above all,
effective strategies empower youth, in all their
diversity, to autonomously and actively influence
and shape the political agenda (Checkoway
2011). This requires decision-makers to develop
policy and programmes for the benefit of youth
(as beneficiaries), with youth (as partners), and
be shaped by youth (as leaders) (SPW/DFID-CSO
2010: 3).8 Such policies can legitimately employ
diverse, culturally sensitive and age appropriate
forms of participation (Checkoway 2011). 
Overcoming obstacles to meaningful youth
participation hence requires transforming
values, and fostering self-esteem and confidence.
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Meaningful participation requires equal
opportunities; proper resourcing; and may be
institutionalised through participation policies
and standards (SPW/DFID-CSO 2010).9 It is an
ongoing process, involving information sharing,
consultation, decision-making and initiating
action, with an aim to progress from consultation
and dialogue towards engagement in the planning,
implementation and co-management of
development interventions (SPW/DFID-CSO
2010). High-quality youth programmes are
characterised by effective alliances of youth
leaders and adult allies. The former serve as
bridging persons across generational boundaries,
while adults can reach out, nurture young
people’s ideas, and build support for their work
(Checkoway 2011). Youth policies should thus
increasingly enable young people to organise
around issues of their choice, enable adults to
engage young people in community agencies, and
enable youth and adults to join together in
intergenerational partnerships (Checkoway et al.
2005). This requires building both the capacity of
young people to engage with adults10 and the
capacity of adults to foster youth–adult
partnerships (SPW/DFID-CSO 2010; UNDESA
2010). ‘Until more non-youth leaders turn to the
youth as equitable partners… youth involvement
will be limited to unproductive demonstrations
instead of powerful movements’ (Fredericks 2010).
5 Conclusion
Demographic change, persistent and
disproportionate unemployment and their feared
implications for political disorder are key drivers
of growing government and donor attention to
youth as a development category. The recognition
that development policies, strategies and
programmes must cater to young people has been
accompanied by a clarion call for appropriate
institutional forms and practices that can foster
more substantial youth participation in decision-
making processes. This article argues that
greater attention needs to be paid to existing
national youth policies. NYPs express African
governments’ ideas on the youth development
challenges, on how to address these, and suggest
more or less explicit theories of change. They
hence provide a broad framework for discussions
on ‘youth in agriculture’. Accordingly I have
analysed national youth policies in Nigeria,
Tanzania and Zambia, for both content, and for
the ways in which they assert particular models of
the policy process. 
Youth policies have wellbeing rather than anti-
poverty objectives, that is, they tend not to
prioritise the poor. While it is fine for policy to
generically frame youth problems, needs and
solutions, programmatic efforts need to be much
more sensitive to difference (gender, ethnicity,
etc.). Currently, the NYPs are ‘under-
operationalised’ in this respect. Moreover, NYPs
assert strong normative aspirations for young
people, but also posit that their failure to live up
to these and their inability to protect them from
themselves legitimates paternalist state
interventions. Although NYPs also identify social
factors, they tend to situate the state at the heart
of youth development, as both cause and solution.
Where empowerment is sought, as in Nigerian
policy, it is done in a disempowering top-down
manner, with youth as passive recipients. 
NYPs also tend to have a stagist
conceptualisation of the policy process, with a
technocratic view of evidence, limited roles for
collective action and a ‘participation-light’
approach. Arguments about youth participation
thus typically intertwine normative and
empirical arguments regarding its effects.
Disentangling these requires greater empirical
enquiry. In terms of collective action, NYPs
recognise and promote a role for private sector
and civil society actors in policy processes, yet
predominantly as service deliverers rather than
as active, (semi-)independent contributors to
policy deliberation, formulation and review.
Youth themselves are also envisaged as passive
clients of government services and seen as
constrained decision-makers. They are rarely
portrayed as or encouraged to be autonomous
agents able to shape their own destinies.
The analysis of youth policies hence suggests
several implications for the ways in which
African states are likely to address the ‘youth in
agriculture problem’. As long as youth are seen
as an undifferentiated and problematic mass
that is to be acted upon, to be protected,
reformed and directed, state action is likely to
take a directive rather than facilitating form.
Agricultural policies are thus likely to prescribe
one-size-fits-all solutions (e.g. modernisation),
that are insensitive to the varied needs and
instrumental ways in which young people engage
in agriculture (Okali and Sumberg, this IDS
Bulletin). Moreover, while youth mainstreaming
and reforms in youth policy content will continue
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in coming years, entrenched stagist perspectives
on the policy process are likely to be more
‘sticky’. Accordingly, participation of African
youth in agricultural and other policies is likely
to remain ‘light’ and continue to under-prioritise
youth empowerment and autonomy.
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Notes
1 Youth issues also need to be addressed in
other policies (e.g. poverty reduction strategy
papers; education; employment; and sexual
and reproductive health strategies). 
2 There are also significant variations by gender
(often, young men stay in school longer,
achieve higher qualifications and start
working later than women), and location
(urban youth start working later and achieve
higher educational attainment than rural
youth) (Garcia and Fares 2008).
3 A notable exception is Zambia, where neoliberal
reforms involved massive public disinvestment
from education: the young in Zambia are now
less educated than older groups.
4 Their study of 55 cities, however, rejects the
argument that youth bulges and unemployment
are likely to lead to political and social
disturbances (Urdal and Hoelscher 2009). 
5 Tanzania’s 2001 agricultural sector
development strategy also notes that
migration from rural areas is increasingly
problematic due to an absence of urban jobs
(Dahl Jensen 2010). 
6 The UNCRC covers children up to 18 years old.
7 For instance, Ghana and Kenya have a good
record engaging young people in agricultural
policy review processes such as CAADP and
the African Peer Review Mechanism
(Zimmermann et al. 2009: 220). 
8 DFID has now adopted a ‘three lens approach’
to youth participation that works for the
benefit of youth (as target beneficiaries), with
youth as partners, and is shaped by youth as
leaders (SPW/DFID-CSO 2010).
9 Some argue that ‘institutionalizing collaboration
requires the establishment of a formal
relationship in which mutual rights and
responsibilities are legally defined and social
sanctions are imposed if such engagement
fails to occur’ (UNDESA 2010: 69).
10 Youth tend to have less experience in dealing
with decision-makers, and can be easily
intimidated by the structures and processes of
governance. Youth from poor rural
communities may speak a different dialect
from the decision-makers or at least know
that their accent ‘lets them down’. For
effective participation of youth, decision-
makers and youth themselves need education,
experience and training (Maguire 2007).
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